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Abstract
Technical change is generally characterized by a rate and biases, both evaluated for
given producer prices. This paper examines the potential discrepancy between this
rate and the corresponding rate of consumer welfare change as measured by Allais
distributable surplus. We postulate a general equilibrium context with various market failures (taxes, quotas, imperfect competition, and “poorly priced” commodities), and use comparative statics to express the rate of welfare change in terms of
the rate and biases of the technical change. An elementary simulation model of a
taxed economy suggests that the rate of welfare change may differ from the rate
of technical change by as much as 50% under plausible circumstances.
JEL Classiﬁcations: D2, D5, D6, O3
Keywords:

productivity,

Allias surplus,

general equilibrium

The very existence of the concept of productivity change, an increase in output per
input, is due to its implications for improved human welfare. Despite this human
welfare motivation, the productivity literature has tended to focus on the production process itself to measure productivity change.1
The limitations of focusing on the production process are evident when one considers that, because of the law of conservation of mass and energy, what goes
into the production process must always come out, and therefore in a fundamental sense there can be no productivity change. What production theory identiﬁes
as “technology” is the relationship between achievable combinations of selected
inputs and outputs—the selection process giving a weight of one to inputs and
outputs deemed signiﬁcant to human welfare, and a weight of zero to others. A
zero–one weighting system for welfare relevance is crude, but necessary for the
useful process of identifying the technological possibilities with respect to welfaresigniﬁcant inputs and outputs. But a change in the production technology does
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not reveal a change in welfare because of the crudeness of this zero–one weighting system. While it is possible to measure local shifts in the technology with distance functions or supporting hyperplanes, such production-oriented measures of
productivity change will measure welfare change only if the implicit weights are the
correct welfare weights, which is unlikely for a number of reasons that we specify
later.
In this paper, we explicitly relate changes in the technology set to changes in
welfare in a general equilibrium context that allows for departures from Pareto
optimality. We characterize technology change in terms of the rate and biases
of the local shift of the technology set. We characterize the associated welfare
change in terms of the Allais–Debreu notion of distributable surplus. We express
the resulting Allais index of productivity change in terms of the rate and biases of
technical change and parameters representing market imperfections. This analysis
allows us to identify the circumstances which cause divergences between the Allais
welfare index of productivity change and the more traditional rate of technical
change, and to assess the extent of those divergences. Divergences we identify and
measure are those due to price distortions from taxes and subsidies, quotas, market power, “poorly-priced” commodities, and those due to price changes induced
by the change in technology.
For many empirical purposes, traditional measures such as the rate of technical
change or total factor productivity will be adequate approximations of the welfare
effects of technical change. We provide some simulation results however, that illustrate that the potential divergence can be as much as ﬁfty percent in the case of
heavily taxed or subsidized sectors. In any case, the analysis here helps to clarify
the relationships between welfare, productivity and technical change, for as Hicks
(1945–1946) wrote with regard to his own study of alternative welfare measures,
“ . . . for the purpose of clear thinking it is necessary that the basic measures
should be distinguished, and their relationship cleared up.”
The paper is organized as follows. In Sections 1 and 2 we present the measures of technical change and welfare change, respectively. In Section 3 we develop
the Allais welfare measure of technical change, we place it in the context of a
closed-economy general equilibrium and examine the comparative statics effects
of technical change. In Section 4 we extend these results to various situations of
market failure, and in Section 5 we present an example by simulating divergences
between the production-oriented vs welfare-oriented measures.

1.

Measures of Technical Change

Traditionally, productivity growth is deﬁned as the difference between the growth
rates of output produced and input used.2 The underlying idea is that this difference reﬂects a change in technology that allows more output to be produced from
a given amount of inputs. The indicators of technical change described in this section infer technological changes from the production behavior of ﬁrms, using either
econometric methods or index numbers. The idea underlying these measures is that
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Figure 1. Welfare effects of technological change with no price distortions.

productivity growth has occurred if the cost of production of a given output has
declined or if proﬁts increase for given prices.3
This literature has focused on scalar measures of the rate of change that characterize such changes as the one from PPF0 to PPF in Figure 1. In this ﬁgure the
lower panel shows the numeraire good y0 on the vertical axis, the other good y
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on the horizontal axis, an initial technology and initial welfare level represented
by PPF0 and u0 , and a subsequent technology and welfare level represented by
PPF and u . In the upper panel the MRS curves (Hicksian demand schedules) are
slopes of the respective indifference curves in the lower panel, and the MRT curves
(supply schedules) are slopes of the production possibility curves. The initial equilibrium at point A in the lower panel corresponds to point a in the upper panel. In
general, no unique scalar value measures “the” increase in productivity, so a number of such scalar measures have been proposed.4 The commonly-used measure of
the rate of technical change which we adopt here is that of Samuelson, Dixit and
Norman, Woodland, Diewert and Morrison, and others. It is the relative change in
maximum variable proﬁts for a given set of prices and resources, which we deﬁne
and use as have Diewert and Morrison and Diewert and Nakamura.
To derive algebraic measures of this concept of technical change, we begin with
the aggregate proﬁt function. Given a vector of ﬁxed resources, z, the production
sector of the economy chooses net output vector (y0 , y) in its feasible production
set, (y0 , y, z) ∈ T , so as to maximize proﬁts given the vector of producer prices
(1, p). It is assumed that the production set T is non-empty, closed and convex.
In perfect competition, the aggregate restricted proﬁt function represents the solution to the following problem
(1, p, z, τ ) ≡ Maxy0 y [y0 + py|(y0 , y, z, τ ) ∈ T ],

(1)

where τ is a technology index, y0 is a numeraire commodity with a price of unity,
y and p are vectors of non-numeraire netputs and their respective prices, z is a
vector of ﬁxed resources and the optimal choice of y satisﬁes5
y = p (1, p, z, τ ) ≡ ∇p (1, p, z, τ ).

(2)

Technical change6 (TC) evaluated at initial equilibrium prices p0 is7
T echnicalChange0 (TC0 ) ≡ (1, p 0 , z, τ  ) − (1, p 0 , z, τ 0 ).

(3)

In the two-good economy illustrated in Figure 1, TC0 corresponds to (y07 − y03 )
in the lower panel and to the area cafg in the upper panel.8 This is Hicks’ Producers’ Equivalent Variation, reﬂecting the change in producer surplus as a result
of a technical change that shifted the economy from an initial equilibrium, evaluating this change at initial equilibrium prices. This deﬁnition and its graphical
illustration provide an obvious parallel with the deﬁnition of Hicksian variations
most commonly used to measure consumer surplus changes. The rate of technical
change (δ) that is used in this paper is the derivative equivalent of this deﬁnition,
as a fraction of initial proﬁt, or δ = (d/dτ )/.9
The nature of technological change can be characterized by bias as well as rate,
as originally suggested by Hicks. Here we use the Binswanger deﬁnition (1974) of
netput bias as the percentage change in the share of netput in proﬁt due to the
technological change under constant prices, βi = dlnki /dτ , where ki = pi yi /. It
is easily shown that share-weighted biases so deﬁned must sum to zero, and that
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2 /y − δ, that is, the difference between
they may also be expressed as βi = ∇pi,τ
i
the rate of change of netput yi and the rate of change in proﬁt. Thus the technological change can be characterized by the rate δ plus a vector of n × 1 biases β
deﬁned as
dlnk
= ŷ −1 ∇ 2 pτ  − ıδ,
(4)
Bias of Technological Change ≡ β ≡
dτ
where ŷ indicates a matrix with vector y displayed on the diagonal, and ı is a n × 1
unit vector.
With unbiased technological change under constant prices, every netput changes
at the rate of technological change δ, and thus there are no changes in shares. This
is equivalent to a homothetic shift in the technology set, which in Figure 1 corresponds to a radial expansion of the P P F , rather than the expansion shown, which
is biased in favor of output y and therefore biased against output y0 .
For notational simplicity we henceforth suppress the vector z, with the understanding that (1, p, τ ) continues to represent the returns to ﬁxed resources.

2.

Partial Equilibrium Measures of Welfare Change

One of the earliest concepts for measuring welfare change is the notion of consumer surplus due to Dupuit and Marshall. Their approach deﬁned surplus in the
context of supply and demand curves in a market for the commodity subject to
taxation.10 The Griliches (1957) study of the impact of hybrid corn technology
was one of the ﬁrst to use this approach to empirically measure welfare effects
of an innovation. The welfare measure he used was the change in social surplus
(consumer and producer surplus) in the market for corn. Many partial equilibrium
studies that followed Griliches’ examined the distribution of welfare beneﬁts due to
process or product innovations. Most of these studies used the Marshallian surplus
notion to evaluate the welfare impact of a research-induced supply shift. It is now
widely accepted that Marshallian consumer surplus is deﬁcient as a welfare measure.
A more acceptable welfare measure is Hicks’ Equivalent Variation (EV). This
measure of the welfare effect of a change from state A to state B is the minimum
amount of money that if given to consumers in state A, would permit the consumer to achieve the utility level of state B.11 This concept is easily represented in
terms of expenditure functions. If the choice (y0 , y) of a representative consumer is
obtained from minimizing expenditures necessary to attain a particular utility level
u given prices (1, p), then the following expenditure function represents the solution to that minimization problem:
E(1, p, u) ≡ Miny0 ,y [y0 + py|u(y0 , y) ≥ u],

(5)

where y0 is the numeraire commodity with price set to unity and the optimal
choice y satisﬁes12
y = Ep (1, p, u) ≡ ∇p E(1, p, u).

(6)

138

FULGINITI AND PERRIN

If the technological change moved the economy from an initial equilibrium
(1, p 0 , u0 ) to (1, p  , u ), then EV is deﬁned as13
Equivalent Variation(EV) ≡ E(1, p 0 , u ) − E(1, p 0 , u0 ).

(7)

In Figure 1, EV corresponds to y06 − y03 which is equal to the area caebg in the
upper panel.

3.

General Equilibrium Welfare-Theoretic Measure of Productivity

The partial equilibrium measures of the beneﬁts of innovations presented in earlier sections are conceptually inadequate because they do not address the gains
or losses imposed on the remainder of the economy when reallocations are made
to particular consumers or in the markets for particular commodities. Also, when
there are market failures, a production oriented measure such as TC differs from a
consumption oriented measure such as EV. To resolve these discrepancies the conceptual framework must be based on some type of general equilibrium analysis
that allows for price endogeneity and for departures from Pareto optimality.
The approach we propose to measuring welfare effects of an innovation has its
roots in the work of Pareto, with more recent contributions by Allais (1973, 1977)
and Debreu (1931), whose work Diewert (1981) refers to as “quantity-oriented”
(measuring welfare change in units of goods.) We consider this approach consistent
with the spirit of general equilibrium, where prices are not ﬁxed but endogenous.
While most of the work using these concepts, mainly by Diewert (1981, 1983), has
focused on taxation as the cause of welfare change, we expand it to consider the
welfare gain emanating from a proﬁt increasing innovation.
Allais deﬁnes his measure of the welfare effect of a distortion, the distributable
surplus or Allais surplus (AS), as the maximum amount of a particular good that
could be extracted from the distorted economy and discarded, without making any
household worse off than in the distorted state, while maintaining the economy in
equilibrium. For a given state of the economy, such a surplus is an intuitive measure of the welfare loss inherent in that state relative to a Pareto optimal allocation. The Allais approach here involves comparison of an initial, pre-innovation
equilibrium with a hypothetical post-innovation reference equilibrium in which all
households are at the same utility level as at the initial equilibrium, but some physical good has been extracted. The reference equilibrium is hypothetical in that the
analysis does not presuppose that such a reallocation would actually occur, even
though an omniscient government might affect such a reallocation and redistribute the distributable surplus in some way that is irrelevant to the measure itself.
Debreu’s “coefﬁcient of resource utilization” is based on this concept, but his disposable surplus is measured in terms of the basket of resources rather than any
particular good. In the two-goods case of Figure 1, bottom panel, the Allais measure in terms of numeraire surplus appears as the maximum vertical line between
PPF and u0 .
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Consider now a general equilibrium for a closed economy in which a representative consumer expenditure function and an aggregate proﬁt function possess the
usual characteristics and can be represented by
E(1, p, u) ≡ Miny0 ,y [y0 + py|u(y0 , y) ≥ u] and
(1, p, τ ) ≡ Maxy0 ,y [y0 + py|(y0 , y, z, τ ) ∈ T ],

(8)

where: y0 is netput quantity of the numeraire good, y is an n × 1 vector of netput
quantities of other goods, p is an n × 1 vector of prices for y, z is an n × 1 vector
of ﬁxed resources, suppressed hereafter, u is the consumer’s utility function, τ is an
index of technological change, T is the feasible technology set.
The general equilibrium conditions for this closed, competitive economy require
that consumer expenditures must equal consumer income and that commodity
markets must clear. These general equilibrium conditions may be represented by
the following equations:
E(1. p, u) = (1, p, τ ),
∇pE = ∇p

(9a)
(9b)

Subscripts represent partial derivatives, both the producer and consumer price of
the numeraire good must equal one, and there are n relative prices and the utility
level u to be determined by these n + 1 equations.
First we wish to consider a “once and for all” exogenous shock to this system
in the form of a technological change from τ 0 to τ  in a perfectly competitive economy, as is illustrated for the two-good case without distortions in Figure 1. Later
we will extend the analysis to incorporate departures from Pareto optimality. Our
measure of the welfare effect of this shock to the system is the Allais distributable
surplus (AS) deﬁned as the maximum amount of numeraire commodity that could
be extracted from the economy with the new technology while keeping consumers
at the original utility level and the economy in equilibrium, or
AS = (1, p, τ  ) − E(1, p, u0 )

such that∇ p E(1, p, u0 ) = ∇ p (1, p, τ  ), (10)

where expenditures and proﬁts are measured in numeraire units (good y0 ), and the
supply-demand conditions are for all goods but the numeraire.14 Note that prices
are determined endogenously rather than being ﬁxed at the pre- or post-innovation level.15 A casual comparison with Technical Change in equation (3) and EV
in equation (7) reveals the difference between a pure production measure, a pure
consumption measure, and this general equilibrium measure.
In the two good case of Figure 1, bottom panel, the Allais measure AS appears
as the maximum vertical line between PPF and u0 , where the slopes of the two
curves are equal, or y04 − y01 . In the top panel this measure is equal to the area of
the triangle chg.16 The reference point C, or (y r , y0r ), is a combination of goods on
the frontier of the new technology that would provide exactly the level of welfare
as the initial equilibrium.
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To quantify the general equilibrium welfare effects of technological change we
modify the equilibrium conditions (9) to include the Allais surplus:
E(1, p, u) + AS = (1, p, τ ),
∇ p E = ∇ p .

(11a)
(11b)

Note that (11) is an alternative way of writing the deﬁnition in (10).
To solve for the Allais surplus created by a technological change dτ , we totally
differentiate the equations in (11) and set du = 0, i.e., there is to be no change in
the utility level:
∇ p Edp + dAS = ∇ p dp + ∇ τ dτ,

(12a)

2
2
∇pp
Edp = ∇pp
dp + ∇ τ dτ.

(12b)

Note that because ∇ p E = ∇ p , dp disappears from (12a), and we can solve (12b)
for the price effect of technological change
2
2
2
dp = (∇pp
E − ∇pp
)−1 ∇pτ
 dτ

(13)

which can be expressed in terms of the rate, δ and biases β, of the technological
change and supply and demand elasticities as
dlnp
= (H − )−1 (ıδ + β),
dτ

(14)

where dlnp is a vector of logarithmic price changes, H is a matrix of compensated demand elasticities,  is a matrix of supply elasticities, and ı is a n × 1 vector
of ones.17 Note also from equation (12a) that to a ﬁrst degree, the Allais welfare
change is equal to the rate of technical change.
From equation (14) it is clear that there are two sufﬁcient conditions for the
Allais surplus extraction to have no induced price effects. The ﬁrst condition is that
all non-numeraire commodity biases be identical and equal to the negative of rate
of technical change (−δ = βi ). This implies that the bias of technical change for the
numeraire commodity is β0 = (1/k0 − 1)δ. The second condition is that all prices be
exogenous i.e., when the diagonal elements of the matrices  or H approach inﬁnity.
Using a Taylor expansion of AS(1, p  , τ  ) from (10) about the equilibrium point
(1, p0 , τ 0 ), we obtain a second-order approximation of the AS associated with a
once and for all technological change:18
AS ≈ (∇ p  − ∇ p E)dp + ∇ τ dτ
 2
 
1
∇ pp E − ∇ 2 pp  ∇ 2 pτ 
dp
+ (dp T dτ T )
dτ
∇ 2 pτ 
∇ 2 pp 
2
1
1
= ∇ τ dτ + dp T ∇ 2 pτ dτ + dp T (∇ 2 pp  − ∇ 2 pp E)dp + dp T (∇ 2 τ τ )dp
2
2
1 2
2
2
−1 2
= ∇ τ dτ − ∇ pτ (∇ pp  − ∇ pp E) ∇pτ dτ,
(15)
2
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where subscripts indicate differentiation and ∇ 2 τ τ  = 0. Given that the second term
of the last line of equation (15) is positive, then to a second degree approximation,the measure of welfare change is at most as big as the measure of technical
change. Dividing AS by initial expenditures E 0 = E(1, p 0 , u0 ), allows us to express
AS as a fraction of initial expenditures, and (15) in terms of shares and elasticities:19
d AS
≈ δ + (ıδ + β)ŝdlnp + (ıδ + β)T ŝ( − H )dlnp
dτ E 0
1
≈ δ − (ıδ + β)T ŝ( − H )−1 (ıδ + β),
2

(16)

where s is an n × 1 vector of expenditure shares, ŝ is a diagonal matrix, and in the
last expression in (16) we have substituted the price change from equation (14).
Equation (16) is a primary analytical result of this paper, an explicit solution of
the consumers’ potential welfare gains20 from technical change in a perfectly competitive economy with no market failures, as a function of the rate and bias characteristics of that technical change. It establishes that to the extent that there are
induced price effects, the rate of technical change δ will most likely overestimate
the welfare impact of an innovation.

4.

Welfare-Theoretic Measure of Productivity Under Market Failure

We now return to the issue of the potential mistakes incurred in productivity measurement when market prices do not reﬂect the subjective valuation of consumers,
due to market failure.21 As we mentioned before, the practice of focusing on production effects rather than consumption effects introduces two potential sources of
error in the evaluation of the economic impact of technical change. These are the
use of the producers’ evaluations rather than the consumers’ evaluations of these
impacts, and the omission of induced price effects due to technical change. It is
clear from the last section that omission of induced price effects is a cause of error
even in perfect markets when a general equilibrium welfare measure, like AS/E, is
used. We now show how this measure differs from the rate of technical change in
the presence of departures from Pareto optimality due to (a) ad valorem taxes and
subsidies; (b) production quotas and rationing; (c) imperfect competition in the
ﬁnal commodity market; (d) imperfect competition in the intermediate commodity market; and (e) “poorly priced” commodities.22 In doing so we will establish
the conditions under which there is no discrepancy between the rate of technical
change, δ, and AS/E in the presence of market failure. We will show that this is
so only in very unusual circumstances.

4.1.

Ad Valorem Taxes and Subsidies

We modify the general equilibrium conditions in equation (9) to describe a general equilibrium in the presence of ad valorem taxes (ρ > 0) or subsidies (ρ < 0),
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so that prices that consumers pay, p, are no longer equal to prices that producers
receive, w:
E(l, p, u) + AS = (l, w, τ ) + ρ ŵ∇ w 
∇pE = ∇w
p = (I + ρ̂)w,

(17a)
(17b)
(17c)

where: ρ is a vector of wedges between consumer and producer prices, ρ̂ indicates
a matrix with vector ρ on the diagonal, and ŵ indicates a matrix with vector w
on the diagonal.
We examine the comparative statics of this 1 + 2n equation equilibrium system
by taking log-differentials of the equations in (17), as we did in deriving equations (15) and (16), noting that (17c) implies (dlnp = dlnw). We solve this system for the induced price change which in this case is the same as equations
(14) and (15). Using a Taylor expansion of AS(1, p  , w  , τ  ) about the equilibrium
point (1, p 0 , w 0 , τ 0 ), we obtain a second-order approximation of the AS associated with technological change in the presence of price distortions. We ignore third
and higher-over derivatives of expenditure and proﬁt functions, effectively assuming them to be zero. This means we are dealing with linear demand and supply
responses in the vicinity of the initial equilibrium.23 Expressed in terms of shares
and elasticities, AS as a fraction of initial expenditures is


1
1
d AS
≈δ 1−
ρ k̂( − H )−1 ι −
ρ k̂H ( − H )−1 β
dτ E0
1 + ρk
1 + ρk
1
−
(18)
(ιδ + β)T [k̂ − ( − H )−1T ρ̂ k̂H ]( − H )−1 (ιδ + β),
2 + 2ρk
where k is an n × 1 vector of proﬁt shares. Compared to equation (16) we note
that policy distortions cause a ﬁrst order departure of the rate of welfare from the
rate of technical change, while induced price changes remain to contribute slightlyaltered second order departures. It is clear that the rate of technical change δ differs from the welfare measure AS/E due to ﬁrst order policy distortions (ρ = 0)
and second order induced price changes. We will pursue the analysis of this case
in more detail below.

4.2.

Quotas and Rationing

We modify equation (9) to describe a general equilibrium in the presence of production quotas or rationing. In this case the netput vector y is composed of two
sub-vectors, an n × 1 vector of unconstrained netputs, y1 , and an m × 1 vector of
netputs with quantity determined by quotas or rationing, y2 , i.e., y = (y1 , y2 ). Consequently the price vector, p for consumer prices and w for producer prices, will
also be partitioned. In addition to the sub-vector of prices for the unconstrained
commodities, p1 for both producers and consumers, we include virtual prices for
constrained commodities. Producers virtual price sub-vector w consists of those
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prices that would induce production of the quota quantities y2 , so that prices relevant to producers are (p1 , w). Similarly, consumers virtual price vector v consists
of those prices that induce consumers to demand exactly the ration y2 , and prices
relevant to consumers are (p1 , v). The quota-constrained general equilibrium conditions can be now expressed as
E(1, p1 , v, u) + AS = (1, p1 , w, τ ) + (v − w)y2
∇p1 E = ∇p1 
∇v E = y2

(19b)

∇w  = y2 .

(19d)

(19a)
(19c)

This system has 1 + n + 2m equations. We solve it for the corresponding price
changes which look similar to those in equation (14)
dlnp̃
˜ −1 (ĩδ + β̃)
= (H̃ − )
dτ
but with the elements redeﬁned as follows:




1p 0 1w
H1p H1v 0
 =  H2p H2v 0 , 
 =  0 0 0 , 
i = i m 0 in
H
0
0 0
2p 0 2w
= [ β1 0 β2 ]T ,
β

(20)

T

,

p
= [ p v w ].

(21)

where subscripts 1 and 2 refer to unconstrained and constrained commodities
respectively, 1p and 2p are price elasticities of supply of y1 and y2 with respect
to market and virtual price vectors, respectively, and similarly for H1p and H2p .
The second order Taylor approximation of the AS/E associated with technological
change in the presence of rationing and quotas can be derived as before, yielding
dAS
≈ (s1 i)δ + s1 β1 − ŝ1 1w 2w −1 (in δ + β2 )
dτ E0
1
˜ − H̃ )−1 (ĩδ + β̃),
− (ĩδ + β̃)T ŝ(
(22)
2
where s1 is the vector of shares of y1 in consumer expenditures, k1 the vector
of shares in producer proﬁts. Equation (22) shows that in the presence of quotas or rationing, the welfare effect AS/E is less than the rate of technical change
δ because of inﬂexibility with respect to the quota good (the vector s2 is missing
from the ﬁrst three terms), as well as because of second order price effects (quadratic term.) Note that the ﬁrst three terms are scaled down in proportion to the
combined shares of the unconstrained commodities.

4.3.

Imperfect Competition in the Market for Final Commodities

There have been a few studies24 that modify the calculation of the rate of technical change to account for the presence of markups characteristic of imperfect
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competition, whereas most commonly, productivity studies assume perfectly competitive markets. Innovations are generally protected by Intellectual Property
Rights (IPRs) which confer monopoly rights to the innovator so it is logical to
allow for them in evaluating welfare beneﬁts of innovations.
Here we modify equation (9) to account for a lack of competitive price conditions in the ﬁnal product market. The output vector is composed of an n × 1 subvector y1 of commodities exchanged in non-competitive markets at price p1 and
an m × 1 sub-vector y2 of commodities exchanged in competitive markets at price
p2 with a markup of ρ2 over marginal cost v. This equilibrium is represented by
a system of general equilibrium equations similar to equation (9)25
E(1, p, u) + AS = (1, w, τ ) + ρ ŵ∇w 
∇p E = ∇w 
p = (I + ρ̂)w,

(23a)
(23b)
(23c)

where: ρ = (0, ρ2 ), where ρ2 is an m × l vector of markups between consumer prices
and producer marginal costs, ρ̂ indicates a matrix with vector ρ on the diagonal,
ŵ indicates a matrix with vector w on the diagonal, p = (p1 , p 2 ), and w = (p 1 , v).
Under the non-competitive structure assumed here, we see that the welfare
impact of an innovation in a monopolistic market has exactly the same structure and solutions as for the case of a tax equal to the markup. Here, monopoly rents are returned to consumers as owners of the monopolies, whereas earlier,
tax returns were returned to consumers for expenditure through their government
agent. This means that as we learned before, the rate of technical change will differ from the welfare impact of an innovation depending on the size of the markups
and an induced price effect. The size of the markup could be arbitrary, but might

 hi ι 
22 

also be determined as the set of multi-market Lerner mark-ups, i.e., ρi = −
i 
1+h22 ι

where hi22 is the ith row of the inverse matrix of Hicksian demand elasticities for
the non-competitive goods y2 .

4.4.

Imperfect Competition in the Market for Intermediate Commodities

We treat this case separately given the prevalence of innovations in intermediate (or input) markets that are protected by IPR’s, conferring monopoly rights to
the innovator. In the literature, the estimation of productivity is most commonly
done in the market for ﬁnal commodities assuming optimal conditions in the rest
of the economy. When monopolistic behavior is present in the intermediate market, the measurement of welfare from the innovation will be affected. Proceeding to measure technical change in the ﬁnal market will miss this effect and will
give a misleading estimate of the impact of the innovation. To adapt the present line of analysis to consider this case, we partition the goods vector into ﬁnal
and intermediate goods. Final goods y f are exchanged in perfectly competitive
markets at prices p f , with production technology represented by f (p f , p i , τ ).
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Intermediate goods y i are exchanged at mark-up prices p i and produced with technology represented by i (p f , v, τ ), where v represents marginal cost of producing
y i . In other words, v is the virtual price that would have induced production y i =
∇v i (pf , v, τ ) under perfectly competitive conditions. The mark-up in this market
is p i = (I + ρ̂)v, which again might be determined according to the multi-commodity Lerner mark-up described previously, though that is not required in the present analysis. Total intermediate market proﬁts thus equals i (p f , v, τ ) + v T ρ̂y i .
Extending the equilibrium in (9) to represent this situation, we have
E(1, pf , u) + AS = f (1, pf , p i , τ ) + i (1, pf , v, τ ) + ρ v̂∇v i
∇pf E = ∇pf  + ∇pf 
f

i

(24a)
(24b)

0 = ∇pi f + ∇v i

(24c)

p = (I + ρ̂v),

(24d)

i

where: ρ = (pi − v) is a vector of intermediate goods markups, ρ̂ indicates a matrix
with vector ρ on the diagonal, v̂ indicates a matrix with vector v on the diagonal.
Once again we can describe the Allais price change associated with technical
change in a format similar to equation (14), speciﬁcally,
dlnp̄
= (H − )−1 (ιδ + β),
dτ

(25)

where now
p̄ = (pf , p i ),


H 0
H=
,  = Kf  f + Ki  i ,
0 0
δ = k f iδ f + k i iδ i ,

and


k̂ f 0
,
K =
0 I


f


k̂ i 0
K =
,
0 I


i

β = Kf β f + Ki β i .

Both the rate and bias of overall technical change are weighted averages of their
sub-sector counterparts. The second order approximation of AS as a fraction of
initial expenditures can then be expressed for the case of monopoly power in intermediate goods as
1 dAS
≈ δ + i T ŝξ(I + ξ )−1 [I −  i ( − H )−1 ](δ + β)
E0 dτ
1
− (δ + β)T ( − H )−1T ŝ[ + Ki  i ξ ]( − H )−1 (δ + β),
(26)
2


00
where ξ ≡
.
0 ρ̂
Here we see that the ﬁrst-order welfare effect consists of a share-weighted average of the rates of technical change in the two sectors plus a market power effect
due to distortion in the intermediate goods market. While one might expect the
market power component to be negative, this is not necessarily the case in this situation where market power exists both before and after the innovation occurs.
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4.5.

Poorly-priced Goods

The ﬁnal case of market imperfection we consider includes a vector of goods, y2 ,
such as environmental goods (or bads) for which consumers do not choose the
level y2 , but receive the beneﬁt or disutility gratis, whereas producers choose the
quantities supplied by equating marginal cost with some exogenous reservation
price not paid in money, w (that could be zero). This general equilibrium can be
represented using restricted expenditure and proﬁt functions as
E(1, p1 , y2 , u) + AS = (1, p1 , y2 , τ )

(27a)

∇p1 E = ∇p1 
w = ∇y2 

(27b)
(27c)

The total differentials of the second two equations determine the adjustments
in price p1 and quantity y 2 , rather than just an adjustment in prices as in the
other general equilibria previously considered. We represent these variables as q =
(p1 , y 2 )T , and the change in equilibrium values is
dlnq
= −( − H̃)−1 (ιδ + β),
dτ
where:




H1p1 H1v
H̃ ≡
,
0
0

−1 
I −1w 2w
≡
,
−1
0 −22

where subscripts represent matrix partitions and v = ∇y2 E, (the consumers virtual
price.) The second-order approximation of the Allais welfare impact of the technical change is in this case
1 dAS
−1
ι)δ + [Sy − (Sv − Sw )( − H̃)−1 ] β
≈ δ − (syT σ12 σ22
E0 dτ
1
− (ιδ + β)T T ( − H̃)−1T [Ŝw  + Ŝv H̃ − 2Ŝw H̃ ]
2
×( − H̃)−1 (ιδ + β).

(28)

where
sy ≡ y1 p̂1 /E0 , Sy ≡ (sy , 0),

Sv ≡ (sy , y2 v̂/E0 ),

Sw ≡ (sw , y2 ŵ/E0 ),

v ≡ Ey2 .

The notation in this case becomes more elaborate due to the asymmetry in producer and consumer responses with respect to the poorly-priced good, but the general structure of results for the case of technical change with poorly-priced goods
is similar to other cases examined. The second term adjusts welfare gains downward to account for the assumption in this model that producers do not receive
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compensation for the poorly-priced good. The third term is a bias adjustment similar to those of previous cases. The algebraic structure of the quadratic term can
be seen to be an augmented version of the previous cases, and though it is too
complicated for qualitative analysis, it is amenable to numerical calculation.

5.

An Illustration: Ad-valorem Taxes and Subsidies

The discrepancy at issue in this paper is that between the rate of technical change
and the Allais welfare measure of the impact of that technical change. We now use
the above results for the tax/subsidy case, equation (18), to evaluate the plausible
size of this discrepancy. It is useful to express (18) in terms of the induced price
changes, as
d AS
1
1
=δ+
ρ k̂β +
[ρ k̂ + (ιδ + β)T (I + ρ̂)k̂] dlnp
dτ E
1 + ρk
1 + ρk
1 1
+
dlnpT [(I − ρ̂) k̂( − H ) + ρ̂ k̂] dlnp.
2 1 + ρk

(18a)

The discrepancy between the welfare effect and the rate of technical change consists of the last three terms of (18a). It is evident that these terms do not go to
zero if only the distortions go to zero or only the induced price changes go to zero.
Either distortions or price effects are sufﬁcient to cause a discrepancy.
The special case of (18a) for an undistorted economy, i.e. ρ = 0, is
AS
1
= δ − (ιδ + β)T ( − H )−1T k̂(ιδ + β)
E
2

(18b)

which gives us back equation (16). Note that as long as the price effects remain,
i. e., dlnp = 0, there will be a discrepancy between the rate of technical change δ,
and AS/E. In general, in an undistorted economy, AS/E ≤ δ due to the induced
price effect of that change captured by the second term in equation (18b), which
is always negative. We also see here that in this case the effects of biases on AS/E
are of a second order magnitude (through dlnp) and will be small.
Another. special case of (18a) of interest is that of no induced price effects, i.e.
dlnp = 0 but with policy interventions remaining, i.e. ρ = 0:
AS
1
=δ+
ρ k̂β.
E
1 + ρk

(18c)

This is consistent with the widely used small open economy models with all prices
exogenous because all commodities are tradables. From the second term in (18c),
we observe that the rates of welfare change and technical change are not equal for
this open economy due to distortions. Furthermore, if the only distortion is a tax
levied on a commodity toward which the technical change is biased, the tax itself
may cause the welfare effect to be greater than the rate of technical change, or
AS/E > δ.
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Table 1. Allais welfare as a fraction of δ, the rate of technical change.a
Price Wedge in Market A (ρA )
Bias toward A (βA )

−1

−0.5

−0.1

0

0.1

0.5

1

−0.5
−0.1
0
0.1
0.5

1.52
1.24
1.16
1.06
0.62

1.17
1.10
1.06
1.01
0.70

0.94
1.01
1.00
0.98
0.74

0.89
0.99
0.99
0.97
0.75

0.84
0.97
0.97
0.96
0.76

0.65
0.90
0.93
0.93
0.79

0.45
0.83
0.87
0.90
0.82

a Three-output

economy, numeraire, A and B, with producer shares 0.6, 0.2 and 0.2, respectively, and
a technical change of rate 0.1. Supply elasticity matrix is a diagonal of 1’s, demand elasticity matrix a
diagonal of −0.5’s. No distortion in market B, and no technical change bias for market B.

It is evident from (18a) that the rate of technical change, δ, will equal the Allais
rate of welfare gain under two circumstances. First, if the economy is not distorted
(ρ = 0) and if all prices are exogenous (dlnp = 0).26 Second, if a fortuitous combination of parameter values eliminates all but the ﬁrst term on the right hand side
of equations (18a), leaving only δ. This conclusion demonstrates algebraically that
the rate of technical change will be an unbiased measure of the welfare effect of
technological change only under very unrealistic situations.27
Analytical generalizations about when AS/E is smaller than or bigger than δ are
not tractable in the case of multiple commodities, even though we have noted some
regularities about this relationship in the previous section. One regularity is that
for an undistorted economy, equation (18b), AS/E is at most equal to δ. Here, the
discrepancy between AS/E and δ results from the fact that δ is by deﬁnition a ﬁxed
priced measure while AS/E accounts for endogenous price changes. The result in
(18b) comes as no surprise as it is clear from the index number literature that ﬁxed
weight productivity and welfare indexes depart from changing weights indexes of
the Törnqvist-Theil type.
It is therefore of interest to use simulation to explore the potential discrepancy
between δ and AS/E. We simulate an economy with three goods, A, B, and the
numeraire, with the numeraire accounting for 60% of consumer expenditures and
A and B accounting for 20 percent each.28 We will examine various levels of distortions in the market for A, and various biases toward that commodity.
The results in Table 1 provide a sense of the potential discrepancy between the
welfare impact of technical change, and the rate of technical change. Here we have
simulated the results of a technical change of rate δ = 0.10 and technical change
biases toward commodity A (ﬁrst column) ranging from −0.5 to +0.5. Note that
βA = 0 implies no bias for any commodity. The columns of Table 1 indicate different levels of intervention in market A, from a 100% subsidy to a 100% tax of that
commodity. The market for commodity B is not distorted and technical change is
neutral for this commodity.
At the center of the table we see that with no distortions and no bias the
second-order induced price effect of equation (18b) reduces the welfare effect by
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only 1% from the rate of technical change. This numerically conﬁrms the analytical result for an undistorted economy in which we expect AS ≤ δ. We can see further that in extreme cases, the welfare effect may be as much as 52% larger than
the rate of technical change (upper left corner) to as much as 55% smaller than
that rate (upper right corner.) These two extreme cases occur when commodity A
receives a 100% subsidy or a 100% tax (ρA = 1 implies that demand price is 100%
greater than supply price), when technology is biased against commodity A.
In general, we see from this table that welfare measures of technical change
exceed the rate of technical change when that technical change is biased against
a commodity that is subsidized. The worst welfare impacts, relative to the rate of
technical change, occur when the bias and tax for a commodity have the opposite
sign, i.e., when technology is biased against a taxed commodity or toward a subsidized commodity. An example of the latter might be agriculture, which is subsidized in most industrial countries, and toward which technical change is probably
biased. A 10% subsidy and 0.1 bias would reduce welfare gains below the rate of
technical change by only 2%, whereas a 10% subsidy combined with a 0.5 bias, (a
rightward agricultural supply shift of 10% due to ρA plus 50% due to βA ) would
reduce the welfare beneﬁt of technical change by 26%, relative to the rate of technical change of 10%.
While the simulation results demonstrate that the rate of technical change could
be a very poor measure of the welfare beneﬁts from technical change, they also
suggest that the discrepancy may be only on the order of 5% or less with small
price wedges and biases of −0.1 to +0.1.
The pattern of results in Table 1 proved to be robust to critical parameter
changes. Additional simulations were performed with different supply elasticities,
demand elasticities, and shares for commodities A, B, and the numeraire. In general, the patterns found in the base simulation of Table 1 survive these parameter
changes for commodities A and B. We found that as the demand elasticities for A
and B decrease and the share of A increases, AS/E is more sensitive to biases and
to policy interventions.

6.

Conclusions

This paper introduces a general equilibrium measure of welfare gains from technical change, a version of the Allais distributable surplus, and argues for its superiority over the traditionally used rate of technical change. This superiority is derived
from the ability of the Allais measure to capture consumers’ as well as producers’ subjective evaluations and to incorporate “market failures.” We use a general
equilibrium model to derive and express the Allais rate of welfare gain in terms of
the rate and biases of the technical change. The algebraic structure of the solution
provides a simple method of computing the price and welfare effects of technical
change in general equilibrium.
The main analytical conclusion derived from the analysis is that the rate of technological change, as usually measured from the production perspective, will hardly
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ever be an unbiased measure of the welfare beneﬁts of technical change. The discrepancy arises because technical change may induce price changes, in which case
the rate will likely overestimate the welfare beneﬁts, or because of market failures
present in the economy.
The analysis is clearly and concisely presented for ﬁve different types of “market
failures”; (a) ad valorem taxes and subsidies, (b) quotas and rationing, (c) imperfect competition in the ﬁnal goods market, (d) imperfect competition in the intermediate goods market, and (e) poorly-priced commodities. In each of these cases
we set up the general equilibrium equations, derive algebraic representations, and
show how to correct for the discrepancy between the rate of technical change and
its welfare impact. The welfare measure is summarized in a single comparative
statics equation for each case, which for the ﬁrst time deﬁnes the Allais welfaretheoretic measure of the effects of technical change, and expresses it in terms of
traditional producer measures, namely the rate of technical change δ and its vector of biases, β.
We illustrate this measure for a simulated three-commodity economy with policy distortions, where we ﬁnd that the discrepancy between the rate of technical
change and the rate of welfare change may be as much as 50% under plausible
conditions.

Acknowledgment
We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for the depth and quality of the review
that was offered.

Notes
1.
2.

Productivity change and technical change are used as synonymous throughout this paper.
Since the work of Tinbergen (1942), Solow (1957) and Jorgenson and Griliches (1967) it has
become traditional to measure productivity growth as the residual output growth not accounted
for by the growth of inputs. This procedure, generally known as the measurement of the “Solow
residual,” is based on the use of a standard neoclassical production function and the assumptions
of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. It involves breaking down the growth rate of
aggregate output produced into contributions from the growth of inputs and the growth of technology. Work prior to Solow’s is summarized in Griliches (1994).
3. A summary of contributions in this area can be found in Morrison Paul (1999). In particular, Samuelson, Dixit and Norman, Woodland, Diewert, Diewert and Morrison, and Kohli have used a
restricted proﬁt function to investigate technical change.
4. See Morrison Paul (1999) for alternative measures used in primal and dual space.
5. Moreover, the proﬁt function (1, p, z, τ ) is linearly homogeneous and convex in (1, p).
If (1, p, z, τ ) is twice continuously differentiable in p then these properties imply that
2 (1, p, z, τ ) is a positive semi-deﬁnite matrix such that p T ∇ 2 p + 2∇ 2 p + ∇ 2  = 0.
∇pp
pp
p0
00
6. In general, technical change can be represented as a difference in levels or as a ratio of levels. If the
technological change moved the economy from an initial equilibrium (1, p 0 , z, τ 0 ) to (1, p  , z, τ  )
then the amount of technical change can be expressed in levels as a change in producer surplus
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evaluated at initial or ex-post prices:
Technical Change 0 (TC0 ) ≡ (1, p0 , z, τ  ) − (1, p 0 , z, τ 0 ),
Technical Change  (TC ) ≡ (1, p , z, τ  ) − (1, p , z, τ 0 ).

(E1)

evaluated at initial prices, is equivalent to (y07 − y03 ), or area gcaf (TC
In terms of Figure 1,
is equal to area gcdb). We note that Hicks did refer to (E1) as producers’ Equivalent and Compensating Variations. The relationship between producers’ surplus and index number theory has been
noticed for some time (Diewert, 1980), and leads to the corresponding technical change indexes:
TC0 ,

QT C 0 ≡ (1, p 0 , z, τ  )/(1, p 0 , z, τ 0 ),
QT C  ≡ (1, p , z, τ  )/(1, p  , z, τ 0 ).
7.

(E2)

The Törnqvist-Theil index captures technical change as
1
Rate of Factor Productivity Change (RFPC) ≡ (k ◦ + k  )dlny,
2

(E3)

where k is a vector of initial netput shares in proﬁt ki = pi yi /, k  is a vector of subsequent netput shares, and dlny is the vector of changes in the logarithms of y. In the two-good case illustrated in Figure 1, RFPC (in levels) corresponds to area gcab, between TC0 and TC . Diewert
(1976) has previously conﬁrmed that the rate of technical change measured by the Törnqvist-Theil
index is bounded by those implied by TC0 and TC . Also, he shows that this index provides an
approximation to productivity change that is exact for certain production functions, exposing the
link between index measurement and econometric estimation.
8. The measure of technical change (3), TC0 , implies a move from A to F (at constant prices p0 ),
or (y07 − y03 ) on the vertical axis of the lower panel. The move from A to F can be decomposed
into a move from A to C plus a move from C to F . Using Allais concepts, equilibriums A and C
are isohedoneous while C and F are on the same output isoquant. If one draws a budget line of
slope p 0 through hypothetical equilibrium C and labels the intercept with the vertical axis y08 (not
shown in the graph) then for this two-goods economy:
0

TC0 = (y07 − y08 ) + (y08 − y03 ) = (y07 − y03 ) or
TC0 = (1, p0 , τ  ) − (1, p0 , τ 0 ) = (1, p0 , τ  ) − E(1, p0 , u0 ) = [(1, p 0 , τ  )
−p0 y r ] + [p0 y r − E(1, p0 , u0 )] = [(1, p 0 , τ  ) − (1, p 1 , τ  )]
+[E(1, ph , u0 ) − E(1, p 0 , u0 )] − y r (p h − pl )
 ph
 p0
∇p (1, p0 , τ  )dp +
∇p E(1, p 0 , u0 )dp − y r (p h − pl )
=
pl

p0

making the connection between the lower panel and the upper panel of Figure 1 obvious.
9. There have been a number of studies that modify this deﬁnition of the rate of technical change to
include adjustments for characteristics of the production structure typically ignored in productivity
growth computations, but that affect the valuation of inputs and outputs. These include situations
where there are discrepancies between market prices and marginal productivities. The adjustments
are based on ﬁnding producers’ shadow values for all inputs and outputs to substitute for market prices in proﬁts (or costs). Distortions considered have been those from imperfect competition
(see for example the studies in Cowing and Stevenson, 1981, and more recently Basu and Fernald
2001), from underutilization of capacity (see Berndt and Fuss, 1986, and other papers in that special issue of the Journal of Econometrics), from economies of scale (Ohta 1975), from pollution
abatement regulations (Denison 1979; Norsworthy, et al., 1979; Crandall 1981; Christiansen and
Haveman, 1981; Pittman, 1983; Färe, et al., 1989; Conrad and Morrison, 1989), or from the existence of a common-property renewable resource (Capalbo, 1986). These producer-oriented studies
focus on measuring technical change as a shift in the technology set.
10. The study of welfare losses, changes in surplus, deadweight loss “triangles”, or waste due to inefﬁcient systems of taxation, or excess burden as it is referred to in the public ﬁnance literature, has a
long history in economics and continues as an active area of research. The existing literature is too
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voluminous for us to summarize here but excellent surveys are found in Curry et al. (1971), Allais
(1973, 1977), Auerbach (1985), Slesnick (1998), and Hines (1999).
11. Hicks’ compensating variation, CV, is the maximum amount of money that could be taken away at
state B and still permit the consumer to achieve the utility level of state A. In Figure 1, CV corresponds to y05 -y02 in the lower panel and to area cdbg in the upper panel.
12. Moreover, the expenditure function E(1, p, u) is linearly homogeneous and concave in (1, p). If
2 E(l, p, u)
E(1, p, u) is twice continuously differentiable in p then these properties imply that ∇pp
2 Ep + 2∇ 2 Ep + ∇ 2 E. Since we assume that the
is a negative semi-deﬁnite matrix such that p T ∇pp
00
p0
expenditure function is increasing in utility, we may normalize this function such that at the initial
equilibrium, ∂E(1, p, u)/∂u = 1.
13. CV is deﬁned as
Compensating Variation (CV) ≡ E(1, p  , u ) − E(1, p , u0 ).

(E4)

In Figure 1, CV corresponds to the distance y05 − y02 and area cdbg. The overlap between the
Hicksian variations and index number theory has been noticed since the beginning (Hicks, 1942)
The Variations evaluate the change in utility as a monetary measure of a difference in utility while
the Konüs’ (1939) quantity index, due to Allen (1949) as a reviewer to this paper noted, represents
it as a ratio
Q0k (p0 , u , u0 ) ≡ E(1, p0 , u )/E(1, p0 , u0 ),

(E5)

Qk (p , u , u0 ) ≡ E(1, p , u )/E(1, p , u0 ).
These can be estimated using econometric methods but proponents of this method have typically
followed a different empirical strategy. The index number approach avoids functional form assumptions on preferences but has more stringent data requirements (see Diewert, 1990a). It evaluates
relative levels of welfare using Samuelson’s (1948) principle of revealed preferences. In general,
using either Hicksian variations or index numbers it is possible to create interval estimates of the
change in welfare in either differences or ratio form. Diewert’s (1992) exact and superlative welfare
change indicators are averages of EV and CV which are exact for certain second order approximations to the expenditure function.
14. For the numeraire
AS = ∇p0 (1, p, τ  ) − ∇p0 E(1, p, u0 ).
15.

(E6)

An alternative measure using the ex-post utility level is deﬁned as
AS = (1, p, τ 0 ) − E(1, p, u );
∇p E(1, p, u ) = ∇p (1, p, τ 0 ),

(E7)

and for the numeraire
AS = ∇p0 (1, p, τ 0 ) + ∇p0 E(1, p, u )
In the special case of homothetic preferences and unbiased technical change (radial expansion of
both, PFF and indifference curve) AS and AS’ converge because there is no income effect.
16. The area equivalent to AS is triangle lkb. In the case of no income effect, AS and AS are measured by the single triangle that results when the two triangles mentioned above merge due to the
absence of a shift in the MRS.
17. The corresponding changes in equilibrium quantiﬁes of goods demanded and supplied are
dlny
(E8)
= [(H − )−1 + I ](ιδ + β),
dτ
where I is the identity matrix and the other terms have been deﬁned in the text.
18. This is the second order Taylor approximation:
AS≡ π(1, p, τ  ) − E(1, p, u0 )
≈ π(1, p0 , τ 0 ) − E(1, p0 , u0 ) + ∇p π 0 p̂ dlnp + ∇τ π 0 dτ − ∇p E p̂ dlnp
1
1
2
2
2
π 0 p̂] dlnp − dlnpT [p̂T ∇pp
E p̂]dlnp + dlnpT [p̂∇pτ
π 0 ] dτ
+ dlnpT [p̂∇pp
2
2

(E9)
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In the text the ﬁrst two terms are not included given that they sum to zero. We note also that as
we are considering a once and for all technical change, throughout the paper we assume ∇τ2τ π = 0.
By making the following substitutions:
∇τ  = δ0 ,
2
∇wτ
 = ŷ(ιδ + β), where ŷ is a diagonal matrix of netputsw ,
2
∇ww
E = ŷ ŵ−1 , where  is the netput supply elasticity matrix,
2
 = ŷHp̂−1 , where H is the netput demand elasticity matrix, and
∇pp

k̂ = ŷ ŵ, a diagonal matrix of netput shares,
equation (15) may be expressed as (16).
20.

From here on we will refer to potential welfare changes with the phrase “welfare changes.” A similar expression can be derived for the ex-post Allais measure, AS , deﬁned in footnote 13.
21. Parham et al. (2000) recognizes the need for a number of adjustments to economy wide total factor productivity growth (with perfect competition and constant returns to scale) to obtain growth
in real income, a crude welfare change indicator. These are: changes in the capital labor ratio, the
growth of the population of working age, the growth in labor force participation, changes in terms
of trade and changes in the unemployment rate. The factors we focus on are not included in this
list. Basu and Fernald (2002) also identify this divergence but their analysis is not based on microfoundations, as noted by Morrison Paul (2001).
22. Many of these factors are mentioned in Diewert (1983, 2001). Diewert (1983) uses an Allais welfare measure to capture waste in the production sector of the economy due to “imperfections.”
Diewert’s paper does not include technical change.
23. Consequently the hypotenuses of the welfare triangles are straight lines rather than curves. The second order Taylor expansion is
2
2
AS ∼
 + [ρ ŵ∇ww
 + ∇τ2w (I + ρ̂)]w
= ∇τ  + ρ ŵ∇wτ
1 T 2
2
2
+ w [∇ww
 + 2ρ̂∇ww
 − (I + ρ̂)∇pp
E(I + ρ̂)]w
2
2
2
2
= ∇τ  + ρ ŵ[I + ∇ww
(∇pp
E(I + ρ̂) − ∇ww
)−1 ]∇wτ 
1 2
2
{(I + ρ̂) + (∇pp
E(I + ρ̂)
+ ∇τp
2
2
−1T
2
2
2
2
−∇ww )
ρ̂∇ww }(∇pp E(I + ρ̂) − ∇ww
)−1 ∇pτ
.

(E10)

To obtain equation (18), in addition to the substitutions in endnote (19) we add:
0 /E 0 = 1/(1 + kρ) allowing us to express (18) also as
1
AS/E 0 = δ + ρ k̂[I + (H − )−1 ](ιδ + β) + (ιδ + β)T [(I + ρ̂)k̂
2
+(H − )−1T k̂ ρ̂](H − )−1 (ιδ + β).
24.
25.

Cowings and Stevenson (1981), Hall (1990), Hulten (2000), Basu and Fernald (2001).
The ﬁrst equation can be equivalently written
a.

26.

(E11)

E(1, p, u) + AS = (1, w, τ ) + (p − w)∇w .

As stated before there will be no price effect when technological change biases for all commodities
except the numeraire are equal to the negative of the rate of technical change (−δ = βi ), or when
all prices are exogenous, i.e. when the diagonal elements of the matrices  or H approach inﬁnity.
27. It is interesting to contrast this conclusion with the one obtained when EV is used to measure the
welfare gains from technological change. EV/E = δ when preferences are homothetic and technical change is unbiased, regardless of policy distortions, and EV/E = AS/E only when there are no
price effects (Perrin and Fulginiti, 2001).
28. Demand elasticities for the numeraire, A, and B were set at −0.17, −0.5 and −0.5, while supply
elasticities were set at 0.67, 1.0 and 1.0.
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